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Abstract 
This research is aimed to examine effect of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard on relationship between 
foreign ownership and profitability in ASEAN. Research samples are 491 manufacture firms listed in stock 
market of Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia from 2012-2013. With regression analysis, 
this research find that ASEAN corporate governance scorecard have effect on relationship between foreign 
ownership and profitability in ASEAN. High ASEAN corporate governance scorecard; as improvement of rights 
of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, 
responsibilities of the board; supports foreign shareholder role in profits increasing. This research shows new 
evidence of role of macro economics level factor, which is corporate governance level in ASEAN countries, as 
foreign owners’ role supporting in profits increasing. ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is important 
factor to answer inconsistencies of role of foreign owner, since foreign ownership will be more growing up in 
open market between countries.      
Keywords: ASEAN corporate governance scorecard, foreign ownership, profitability 
 
1. Introduction 
In general, a business firm established to maximizes profits. Profits are the most vital entity which demonstrates 
the financial stability and strength of any firm (Tabassum et al., 2014). It refers to the bottom line item of income 
statement which exhibits how company is financially beneficial and adding value to the shareholder’s wealth. It 
is an indicator of financial health and competitive position within industry. Firm ability to increases profits is 
profitability. 
Agency conflict is one of problem to increases profitability. Agency conflict exists because there is conflict 
of interest between shareholders and management (Chen et al., 2012; Gilson and Whitehead, 2008; Renders and 
Gaeremynck, 2012). Management with bigger power than shareholder will act based on their own interests (Lee, 
Park, et al., 2015). Management works with less consideration of shareholders wealth, such as profit 
maximization. This conflict is getting bigger because shareholders could not monitors daily activities of 
management. In order to minimize agency conflict, shareholders have to do management monitoring, so 
management will act based less on their own interests and more on increasing shareholders wealth and firm 
value by profits increasing. Previous researches have been proving that share ownership factors can decrease 
agency conflict by minimizing of information asymmetry (Shiri et al., 2016), financing cost (Tan and Ma, 2016), 
and maximizing of profit (Cheung et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2005).  
One type of share ownership is foreign ownership. Foreign ownership is shareholders of firm of across 
country. Foreign investor can increase management performance (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2014; Wei et al., 2005). 
Foreign investor have specific financial and business characteristics, which are the international diversification 
of earnings should decrease the variability of cash flows and bankruptcy costs than domestic firms (Gurunlu and 
Gursoy, 2010). Foreign shareholders have higher labor productivity, wages and export intensity than local firms, 
though technological intensities (Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009). Foreign shareholders have better monitoring 
of management as well is, than domestic shareholders, because foreign shareholders is more independent 
(Ahmed and Iwasaki, 2015). 
In the other hand, foreign ownership can decrease profits as well. Foreign shareholders do not really attach 
to domestic firm, because they have international investment channels than domestic shareholders, so foreign 
shareholders have short term relationship to domestic firm (Kim, 2011). Foreign ownership leads to bigger cost 
of foreign capital structure (Eun and Janakiramanan, 1998), so it will decrease profitability. Foreign ownership 
can improve information asymmetric as well, because of differences of language and geographic between home 
country (origin of foreign shareholders) and host country (firm owned by foreign shareholders). 
It is important to analyze foreign ownership, because the rapid globalization of financial markets in recent 
years has been accompanied by a growing number of firms raising capital abroad (Bell et al., 2014). In China, 
external opening market of import makes foreign direct investment increases (Zhang and Roelfsema, 2014), such 
as acquisition of assets (Lau and Bruton, 2008). It shows that foreign ownership is one of the most important 
factor that affect firm performance, especially profitability, when ownership of firm’s shares across country. 
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Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries have been affect by globalization as well. 
ASEAN countries have established ASEAN Economics Community (AEC), and it is believed that in 2015, 
ASEAN borders will be fully open to allow free flows of capital and labor across country’s borders 
(Nikomborirak, 2015), include stock market integration (Lee and Jeong, 2016). Less barriers of capital market 
between ASEAN countries will increases foreign investment and capital as well. Based on data accessed in 
World Bank (2016a), there are increasing of foreign direct investments in ASEAN countries from 2012 to 2013, 
for Indonesia 10 percent, Malaysia 27 percent, Philippines 16 percent, Singapore 16 percent, Thailand 24 percent. 
Weather foreign ownership increases profits or not, depends on corporate governance of firms in stock market in 
each country of ASEAN. Each country have optimal standards of ownership supporting by good corporate 
governance implementation, so it can maximizes shareholders wealth and increases profits. 
Inconsistency of foreign ownership effects on profitability depends on condition of the country, especially 
condition of corporate governance in stock market. If the country believes and fully supports foreign ownership 
as corporate governance mechanism, then foreign ownership will increases profitability (Viana et al., 2010). 
Corporate governance tend to foster a more open and equitable distribution of information and place a stronger 
emphasis on the protection of shareholders rights and, in particular, those of minority investors (Maher and 
Andersson, 1999). Since role of foreign shareholders is important, then this research will examine whether 
foreign shareholders protection and transparency strengthen the role of foreign ownership to increases 
profitability. 
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
stakeholders in the system, such as the board, managers, shareholders and spells out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs (Madhani, 2016). Further, Madhani (2016) stated that corporate 
governance provides an ethical process as well as well-defined structure through which the objectives of the firm, 
the means of attaining such objectives, and systems of monitoring performance are also set. Corporate 
governance in stock market could be seen as well as corporate governance mechanism by political and legal 
structure, public monitoring (Forti et al., 2011), investor protections and public policy making (Guillen and 
Capron, 2016) to increases profitability. 
ASEAN Capital Market Forum (2015) introduce ASEAN corporate governance scorecard as assessment of 
corporate governance of all listed firms of capital markets in countries of ASEAN. It shows corporate 
governance practices covers area of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of 
stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, responsibilities of the board (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 2015). 
It is important to examine corporate governance in ASEAN, because firms in ASEAN nations have operated in 
environments where government policies were lacking and the market structure was underdeveloped (Liu, 2016), 
at the same time, ASEAN will be a powerful by representing the third largest economic cooperation following 
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Europe Union (EU) (Lee and Jeong, 2016).  
ASEAN Economics Community (AEC) is just fully performed in 2015 (Nikomborirak, 2015; Yean and Das, 
2015), and yet, there are researches studying macro economics level factors as one region (eg. Lee and Jeong, 
2016; Niblock et al., 2014; Nikomborirak, 2015; Yean and Das, 2015) in order to examine impact of AEC as an 
act to keep up the development of AEC. This research will use macro economics level factor, which is corporate 
governance of all listed firms in stock market, as consideration of micro economics level factor decision making. 
This research shows new evidence of role of macro economics level factor, which is corporate governance in 
stock market of ASEAN countries, as foreign owners’ role supporting in profitability increasing. Corporate 
governance is important factor to answer inconsistencies of role of foreign owner, since foreign ownership will 
be more growing up in open market between countries, in profitability increasing. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Foreign Ownership and Profitability  
In terms of agency theory, management (agent) have a contract with owner (principal) which is delegating of 
authority from owner to management to manage firm as owner interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Owner 
have to monitor management, so that management could increases owner wealth by profit increasing. In stock 
market context, shareholders wealth is the purpose of agency relationship. One of shareholders wealth indicators 
is net profits. Profits can be increased if shareholders have better support and monitoring to management. Type 
of ownership is important to determine if management is working follow shareholders interest. 
Foreign shareholder is one type of ownership that have effect on profitability. There are arguments said that 
foreign ownership have positive relationships with firm performance, while others predict negative relationships; 
each theory have conditions under which its arguments hold (Lee, Kim, et al., 2015). Firm with foreign 
ownership have competitive advantages. Internalization theory said that foreign ownership enhances revenue by 
developing new markets for its assets from abroad; such as superior research and development (Gande et al., 
2009), marketing production capabilities, consumer goodwill (Fang et al., 2008; Lee, Kim, et al., 2015), higher 
labor productivity, wages, export, technological intensities (Mithas and Rust, 2016; Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 
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2009; Wei et al., 2005) and international manager talents (Wei et al., 2005). Those components are unique 
competitive advantages that cannot easily enhanced by domestic ownership. In cost efficiency, foreign 
ownership have financial and business advantages as well, such as open accesses of international capital market 
and hard currency (Wei et al., 2005), the international diversification of profits should decrease the variability of 
cash flows and bankruptcy costs than domestic firms (Gurunlu and Gursoy, 2010). In terms of corporate 
governance, foreign shareholders have better monitoring of management as well, than domestic shareholders, 
because foreign shareholders is more independent (Ahmed and Iwasaki, 2015). 
In the other hand, foreign ownership can reduce profitability as well. In international level, imperfections of 
global market support this argument, because it is difficult to optimally diversify their businesses internationally 
due to such barriers as institutional restrictions on overseas capital flows and information asymmetries (Lee, Kim, 
et al., 2015). It leads to bigger cost of foreign capital structure (Eun and Janakiramanan, 1998), and will decrease 
profitability. There is lack of compatible of development of competitive advantages brought from home country 
(origin of foreign ownership) as well, such as technological investment. New technological investment have 
risks such as firms may not be able to realize complex interrelationships among information technology systems, 
get locked into poor and incompatible systems and may suffer from information overload, leading to reduced 
learning (Mithas and Rust, 2016). It will be able to get benefits of international diversification if global market is 
sufficiently integrated. 
In firm level, manager factor can be a reason why foreign ownership reduces profitability. Foreign manager 
can improve information asymmetric as well, because of differences of language and geographic between home 
country and host country. In multinational firm context, it is hard for foreign shareholders to monitor managerial 
decision because of complexity of corporate structure with many foreign subsidiaries across country (Lee, Kim, 
et al., 2015). Not only foreign manager have adaptation difficulty in domestic environment, but domestic 
manager have adaptation difficulty in firm where foreign shareholders have brought foreign atmosphere in some 
business activities, such as social capital domestic CEO that can reduce foreign ownership (Goyer and Jung, 
2011). 
This research will analyze two of contrast arguments about relationship between foreign ownership and 
profitability with consideration of country level, especially in ASEAN. It is important because ASEAN 
Economic Community have been established and will affect barriers between countries as restrictions effect of 
foreign shareholder to increase profitability. 
 
2.2 ASEAN Economics Community (AEC) 
ASEAN consists of ten diverse economies, ranging from Singapore, with GDP per capita at nominal value of 
US$ 55,182 (ranked 8th of 183 countries in the world in 2013) to Cambodia with GDP per capita at nominal 
value of US$ 1,028 (ranked 156th) (Nikomborirak, 2015). ASEAN has come a long way in reducing barriers to 
trade in goods among member countries since the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area Agreement, signed in 
1993 (Nikomborirak, 2015), and have been made blueprint of ASEAN Economics Community (AEC) in 2007 
with goal level about 90.5 percent in 2015 (Yean and Das, 2015). The Blueprint consists of four key pillars: (1) a 
single market and production base; (2) a highly competitive economic region; (4) a region of equitable economic 
development; and (4) a region fully integrated into the global economy (Nikomborirak, 2015). AEC could 
produce gains similar to those resulting from the single European market and the benefits could be doubled if the 
regional integration also leads to new free trade agreements with key external partners (Lee and Jeong, 2016). 
Advantage of AEC is less barriers can make less cost to make business within countries in ASEAN. In contrary, 
disadvantage of AEC is transferring resources from home country abroad will make domestic business decreases.  
AEC have effect on stock market as well. Capital market in ASEAN countries have been integrated and 
driven by country-level economic situations (Lee and Jeong, 2016). It leads to growing up of foreign investment 
flows in to ASEAN. AEC makes investment, especially stock investment between countries will be less barriers. 
Foreign investors, especially in develop countries, will send significant portion of their investment to emerging 
market, such as Southeast Asia (Niblock et al., 2014). It leads to more foreign ownership in a country, either 
from other ASEAN countries or outside ASEAN countries. 
 
2.3 ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 
In 2009, the ASEAN Finance Ministers endorsed the ASEAN Capital Market Forum (ACMF) implementation 
plan to promote the development of an integrated capital market (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 2015). This 
initiative is undertaken in parallel with the efforts to achieve convergence in ASEAN countries by 2015 as an 
economic community. Broadly the ACMF implementation plan seeks to achieve the objectives of the ASEAN 
Economic Community aspirations through the following areas, which are creating an enabling environment for 
regional integration, creating the market infrastructure and regionally focused products and intermediaries, 
strengthening the implementation process, enhancing the visibility, integrity and branding of ASEAN as an asset 
class (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 2015). 
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The ASEAN corporate governance initiative comprising the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard and 
the ranking of corporate governance of ASEAN public-listed firms are among several regional initiatives under 
the ACMF (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 2015), started in early 2011 and is supported by the Asian 
Development Bank (2016). The objectives of the Scorecard and the ranking exercise are to raise corporate 
governance standards and practices of ASEAN public-listed firms, showcase and enhance the visibility as well 
as investability of well-governed ASEAN public-listed firms internationally, complement the other ACMF 
initiatives and promote ASEAN as an asset class (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 2015). The ASEAN 
Scorecard was developed based on national benchmarks such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance, International Corporate Governance Network 
Corporate Governance Principles, as well as best practices from the ASEAN and the world (Asian-Development-
Bank, 2016a). The Scorecard covers the following five areas of the OECD principles, which are rights of 
shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and 
responsibilities of the board (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Full assessment divided by weightage allocation 
of those five areas; which are 10 percent of rights of shareholders, 15 percent of equitable treatment of 
shareholders, 10 percent of role of stakeholders, 25 percent of disclosure and transparency, and 40 percent of 
responsibilities of the board. Assessment of each country is done by the Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Directorship for Indonesia; the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group for Malaysia; the Institute of Corporate 
Directors for Philippines; the Singapore Institute of Directors and Centre for Governance, Institutions and 
Organizations as well as National University of Singapore Business School for Singapore; and the Thai Institute 
of Directors for Thailand (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016b). 
 
2.4 ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard, Foreign Ownership and Profitability 
There is argument said that foreign ownership have positive relationships with profitability. Firm with foreign 
ownership have competitive advantages from abroad; such as superior research and development (Gande et al., 
2009) that leads to higher export (Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009), higher product quality and higher revenues. 
Foreign shareholders could brings marketing and production capabilities, and consumer goodwill (Lee, Kim, et 
al., 2015) that leads to higher revenues. Foreign shareholders increases wages (Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009), 
brings international manager talents as well as open accesses of international capital market and hard currency 
(Wei et al., 2005), and the international diversification of profits (Gurunlu and Gursoy, 2010), and will leads to 
higher labor productivity (Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009) and cost efficiency and wider international market. 
Foreign shareholders have better monitoring of management as well, than domestic shareholders, because 
foreign shareholders are more independent (Ahmed and Iwasaki, 2015), so foreign shareholders can make 
management works effectively and increases profitability. Those advantages that brought by foreign 
shareholders can increases firm profits. 
In contrary, foreign ownership can reduce profitability as well. In international level, imperfections of 
global market support this argument, because it is difficult to optimally diversify their businesses internationally 
due to such barriers as institutional restrictions on overseas capital flows and information asymmetries (Lee, Kim, 
et al., 2015). It leads to bigger cost, especially cost of foreign capital structure (Eun and Janakiramanan, 1998), 
and will decrease profitability. There is lack of compatible of development of competitive advantages brought 
from home country (origin of foreign ownership) as well, such as technological investment. New technological 
investment have risks such as firms may not be able to realize complex interrelationships among information 
technology systems, get locked into poor and incompatible systems and may suffer from information overload, 
leading to reduced learning (Mithas and Rust, 2016). Firm will spends more money to make good technology 
implementation and reduce profits. 
In firm level, manager factor can be a reason why foreign ownership reduces profitability. Foreign manager 
can improve information asymmetric as well, because of differences of language and geographic between home 
country and host country. Foreign manager will having hard time to determines consumers target. In 
multinational firm context, it is hard for foreign shareholders to monitor managerial decision because of 
complexity of corporate structure with many foreign subsidiaries across country (Lee, Kim, et al., 2015). Not 
only foreign manager have adaptation difficulty in domestic environment, but domestic manager have adaptation 
difficulty in firm where foreign shareholders have brought foreign atmosphere in some business activities. 
Foreign shareholders have different perception on business activities with domestic manager. Foreign 
shareholders see business activities in international context, while domestic manager look business activities in 
domestic context Previous research found that social capital domestic CEO can reduce foreign ownership (Goyer 
and Jung, 2011) because of difference perception between foreign shareholders and domestic manager. 
Inconsistency of foreign ownership effects on profitability depends on corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is the key of monitoring mechanism to create good performance of firm. One of monitoring 
mechanism is shareholders structure, includes foreign shareholders, while the other is shareholders protection 
(Man and Wong, 2013). It shows that role of shareholders will have no effect on profitability if their rights does 
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not support by condition of good governance by firm. One of measurement of corporate governance, especially 
in ASEAN countries, is ASEAN corporate governance scorecard. ASEAN corporate governance scorecard 
shows corporate governance practices in areas of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role 
of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the board (Asian-Development-Bank, 
2016a). 
Area of rights of shareholders and equitable treatment of shareholders ensures clear voting right, decision 
making process, approve of board selection, voting class of shares, and conflict of interests (Asian-Development-
Bank, 2016a). Both areas of rights of shareholders and equitable treatment of shareholders makes sure that 
foreign ownership could uses their rights to contributes in decision-making of competitive advantages increasing 
(Fang et al., 2008; Gande et al., 2009; Gurunlu and Gursoy, 2010; Lee, Kim, et al., 2015; Mithas and Rust, 2016; 
Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009; Wei et al., 2005), monitoring of management (Ahmed and Iwasaki, 2015) as 
well as picture of reducing entrenchment effect of majority shareholders (Zerni et al., 2010), if foreign 
shareholders act as minority shareholders. Another evaluation such as is there any disclosure in English language 
(Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a), so foreign shareholders have low information asymmetric. Shareholders 
protection is the key of good corporate governance to improve role of shareholders (Maher and Andersson, 1999; 
Man and Wong, 2013). 
Area of role of stakeholders ensures activities related to customer welfare; communities; creditors’ rights; 
environmental sustainability; and employee safety, health, and welfare (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). 
Corporate governance area of role of stakeholders makes sure role of foreign shareholders to improves decision-
making process related to consumer goodwill (Lee, Kim, et al., 2015), higher labor productivity and wages 
(Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009; Wei et al., 2005).This corporate governance area will support foreign 
shareholders decision making of  foreign manager hiring, related to employee safety, health, and welfare. 
Area of disclosure and transparency related to annual report; ensures disclosure of board activities, risk 
management, financial performance, auditing activities, whistle blowing policy, related party transaction, 
language availability and firms’ website (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a).  Corporate governance area of 
disclosure and transparency will improves role of foreign shareholders by reducing information asymmetric 
(Madhani, 2016) because differences of domestic language and environment (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a; 
Lee, Kim, et al., 2015) as well as insider trading (Kho et al., 2009). 
Area of responsibilities of the board ensures board and its committee activities to implement good corporate 
governance (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Corporate governance area of responsibilities of the board 
improves foreign ownership in management monitoring. As proxy of shareholders in management daily 
activities, board have important role to make sure management acts in line with shareholders interests (Man and 
Wong, 2013), including foreign shareholders interest. 
Ha: Foreign ownership increases profitability, if ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard of country is high. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sources of Data 
This research will examine effect of stock market development on relationship between foreign ownership and 
profitability in five countries of ASEAN, which are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. 
These five countries have better access of data of this research than other countries of ASEAN. Data will be got 
from financial statement and Asian Development Bank (2016a, 2016b). Financial statement can be accessed 
from website of stock market of five countries. Data that will be needed are number of share held by foreigner, 
number of share traded in stock market, closing market price of share, book value of equity, book value of 
liabilities from financial statement. ASEAN corporate governance scorecard of country and  rank of ASEAN 
corporate governance scorecard of firms will be got from Asian Development Bank (2016a, 2016b) accessed in 
www.worlbank.org. 
 
3.2 Research Sample  
Research sample of this research is manufacture firms listed from 2012-2013 in stock market of five countries of 
ASEAN. Based on data available in World Bank (2016b), contributions of manufactures industry to economics 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, have decreased from 2011-2013.  Therefore, it is 
important to examine manufacture firms value related to foreign ownership as an effect of establishment of 
integrated stock market in ASEAN. Firm with negative book value of equity will be excluded because it 
indicates insufficiency of shareholder financing on firm activities. Based on table 1, there are 491 firms as 
research sample and 982 observations. 
 
 
 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.9, No.8, 2018 
 
165 
Table 1. Research Sample 
Firms in each country Total 
Indonesia Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 
Incomplete data 
Negative Book Value of Equity 
93 
(10) 
(3) 
80 
Malaysia Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 
Negative Book Value of Equity 
211 
(3) 
208 
Philippine Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 20 20 
Singapore Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 
Negative Book Value of Equity  
120 
(3) 
117 
Thailand Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 
Data in local language 
71 
(5) 
66 
Number of Firms 491 
Number of Observations 982 
 
3.3 Analysis Model  
This research will run regression analysis as hypothesis test. Regression model proposed is as followed: 
 
where: 
Profitabilityit = Profitability i country j period t  
FORijt = Foreign Ownership firm i country j period t 
SCORECARDjt = ASEAN Corporate Governance  Scorecard country j period t 
LEVijt = Leverage firm i country j period t 
SIZEijt = Size of firm i country j period t 
MBVijt = Market to Book Value firm i country j period  t 
Rank50ijt = Big 50 of ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (dummy variable) firm i country 
j period  t 
This research will run panel regression model selection test as preliminary test. This research will use fixed-
effect redundant test and hausman test to select robust model between common-effect model, fixed-effect model, 
and random-effect model. 
 
3.4 Variables  
Dependent variable is profitability. Profitability could seen by return on equity (ROE). ROE is measured is as 
followed: 
 
This research uses ROE because of consideration of profitability based on shareholders role. It is showed by 
profits that generates by the use of equity (shareholders financing). 
Independent variable is foreign ownership. Foreign ownership is measured by the proportion of shares held 
by foreign investors as follow (Ahmed and Iwasaki, 2015; Eun and Janakiramanan, 1998; Wei et al., 2005): 
 
Moderating variable is corporate governance in country level. Corporate governance measured by country’s 
average score of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard of all listed firms in five capital markets of Thailand, 
Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia accessed in ASEAN corporate governance scorecard assessment 
report by Asian Development Bank(2016a, 2016b). It shows average corporate governance score that covers area 
of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, 
responsibilities of the board (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 2015). 
Control variables are leverage, size of firm, market to book value, firm’s rank in ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard. Leverage is the use of debt in capital structure. Debt is a capital source that increases the 
risk associated with future profits, while firm with big size have big assets as resources to increase performance 
(Muzir, 2011), while market to book value shows firm growth that can increases profits. Leverage measured by 
debt to equity ratio (total of debt divided by total equity). Firm size measured by value of logarithm of total 
assets. Market to book value is measured by firm market capitalization end of period divided by total equity. 
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Firm’s rank in ASEAN corporate governance scorecard shows good corporate governance based on ASEAN 
corporate governance scorecard assessment; measured as dummy variable; value 1 (one0 if firm includes in big 
50 of  ASEAN corporate governance scorecard in its country, 0 (zero) otherwise. 
    
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Based on table 2, mean of ROE in five countries of ASEAN is 0.1396. The lowest mean of ROE in 
Malaysia which is 0.0570, while the highest in Indonesia which is 0.2847. Mean value of foreign manufacture 
firm ownership in five countries of ASEAN is 0.1580. Surprisingly, Indonesia that have requirement to apply for 
permission from the Central Bank of Indonesia for the repatriation and inflows of foreign funds (Niblock et al., 
2014) have the highest mean value of foreign ownership with 0.3510, while Malaysia that have regulation to free 
inflows of foreign funds (Niblock et al., 2014) have the lowest mean value of foreign ownership with 0.1102. On 
average, ASEAN corporate governance scorecard in five countries of ASEAN is 63.3137. Indonesia have the 
lowest development of stock market with mean value 48.9200, while Singapore have the highest development of 
stock market with mean value 71.5250. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Test 
Table 3. Regression Test of All Sample 
 COEFFICIENT 
 Common-Effect Fixed-Effect Random-Effect 
Constant 0.689528 0.784136 0.650890 
FOR -3.715914** 2.330694 -3.680884** 
FOR_SCORECARD 0.076493* 0.082031** 0.076897* 
SCORECARD -0.010480 -0.008615 -0.009903 
LEV 0.054826 0.115299 0.055254 
SIZE -0.006267 -0.149772 -0.007039 
MBV -0.007315 0.026756 -0.007622 
Rank50 0.008684 -0.007809 0.009756 
Sig. of Redundant Fixed-Effect Test  0.0139**  
Sig. of Hausman Test   0.0000* 
Sig. of F-Statistics 0.003274* 0.006523* 0.002319* 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.014604 0.113195 0.015483 
*Significant in level 0.01 
**Significant in level 0.05 
***Significant in level 0.10 
FOR = Foreign Ownership 
SCORECRAD = ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 
LEV = Leverage of firm  
SIZE = Size of firm 
MBV = Market to Book Value 
Rank50 = Big 50 of ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (dummy variable) 
Based on table 3, significance value of fixed-effect redundant test is 0.0139 (significant in level 0.05). It 
means that fixed-effect model is better than common-effect model. Significance value of hausman test is 0.000 
(significant in level 0.01). It means that fixed-effect model is better than random-effect model. This result shows 
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that fixed-effect model is the best model among these three models. 
Foreign ownership have coefficient value 2.330694 (insignificant). It means that foreign ownership have no 
positive on profitability. This result is in line with inconsistence role of foreign ownership that gives competitive 
advantage on profitability, and have to be moderates by corporate governance that supports foreign shareholders 
position. 
Variable of interaction between foreign ownership and ASEAN corporate governance scorecard have 
coefficient value 0.082031 (significant in level 0.05). It means that ASEAN corporate governance scorecard 
have significant effect on relationship between foreign ownership and profitability. ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard is strengthening positive effect of foreign ownership on profitability. Hypothesis of this 
research is accepted. Foreign ownership increases profitability if ASEAN corporate governance scorecard of a 
country is high. High governance scorecard; in areas of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of 
shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the board; improving 
contribution of foreign shareholders in decision-making of competitive advantages increasing, improving 
monitoring of management, reducing entrenchment effect of majority shareholders, increases role of foreign 
ownership to improving decision-making process related to consumer goodwill and higher labor productivity and 
wages, reducing information asymmetric and insider trading, and have support by board roles as well. 
 
4.3 Robustness Test 
As robustness test, this research will performs regression of each country as well. Results of regression of each 
country are as followed: 
Table 4. Regression Test of Each Country 
 COEFFICIENT 
 Thailand Singapore Philippines Malaysia Indonesia 
Constant -0.069 5.264 0.314 -0.127 0.328 
FOR 0.600** 3.415* -0.095 -0.037 -0.086 
LEV 0.082*** -.0245 0.097** 0.063* 0.094 
SIZE -0.012 -0.632 -0.032 0.017 -0.012 
MBV 0.058 -0.126 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
Rank50 0.069 0.968 0.022 0.076 0.081 
N 132 234 40 416 160 
*Significant in level 0.01 
**Significant in level 0.05 
***Significant in level 0.10 
FOR = Foreign Ownership 
LEV = Leverage of firm  
SIZE = Size of firm 
MBV = Market to Book Value 
Rank50 = Big 50 of ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (dummy variable) 
Based on table 4, foreign ownership have no significant effect on profitability in Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Indonesia. In the other hand, foreign ownership have positive significant effect on profitability in Thailand 
(significant in level 0.05) Singapore (significant in level 0.01). As expected, Thailand and Singapore with the 
highest and second highest ASEAN corporate governance scorecard assessment between five countries of 
ASEAN supports the role of foreign shareholders in profits increasing. It is consistence with result of hypothesis 
test. 
Main strength of Thailand corporate governance in “Right of Shareholders” area is shareholders are allowed 
to elect directors individually and discloses detail activities of annual general meeting in minutes (Asian-
Development-Bank, 2016a). Main strength of Thailand corporate governance in “Equitable Treatment of 
Shareholders” area is notice of auditor and dividend as well as disclosure of related party transactions are fair 
and at arm’s length (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Main strength of Thailand corporate governance in 
“Right of Stakeholders” area is policy of treatments of stakeholders and social responsibility (Asian-
Development-Bank, 2016a). Main strength of Thailand corporate governance in “Disclosure and Transparency” 
area is good firm’s website and disclosure of corporate group structure, related party transactions, audit fees, and 
contact details of investor relations (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Main strength of Thailand corporate 
governance in “Responsibility of the Boards” area is clear disclosure of responsibility, policy and code of 
conduct, separation chair and executive officer, orientation programs, and review of the internal control and risk 
management system of the boards (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). 
Main strength of Singapore corporate governance in “Right of Shareholders” area are boards appoint an 
independent party to evaluate fairness of the terms and conditions of the transaction in case of substantial 
mergers, acquisitions, and/or takeovers, and discloses detail activities of annual general meeting in minutes 
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(Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Main strength of Singapore corporate governance in “Equitable Treatment 
of Shareholders” area is notice of insider information and dividend as well as disclosure in English version 
(Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Main strength of Singapore corporate governance in “Right of Stakeholders” 
area is policy of reward/compensation, whistle-blowing, and social responsibility (Asian-Development-Bank, 
2016a). Main strength of Singapore corporate governance in “Disclosure and Transparency” area is disclosure of 
boards’ activities and its committees performance, indirect shareholding, and fast 120 days of audited financial 
report releases (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Main strength of Singapore corporate governance in 
“Responsibility of the Boards” area is clear disclosure of responsibility and review of the internal control and 
risk management system of the boards and more contribution of independent board members (Asian-
Development-Bank, 2016a). 
Main strength of Thailand and Singapore corporate governance supports role and monitoring of 
shareholders, especially foreign shareholders, on profitability. Points that have to be improved for Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia are lack of details in annual general meeting, poor dividend policy, poor responsibility 
of board disclosure, lack of auditor services fee disclosure, poor customers and suppliers policy, and poor 
shareholding disclosure (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). 
As robustness test, this research will performs panel regression with other alternatives variables 
measurement as well. Alternative is measurement of profitability. This research will performs panel regression 
test with return on assets (ROA) as profitability as well. ROA shows firm’s ability to generate profits with the 
use of total assets. ROA is measured by earnings after tax divided by total assets. 
Table 5. Alternatives of Regression Test 
 COEFFICIENT 
Constant 0.251755 0.784136 
FOR 0.671529 2.330694 
FOR_SCORECARD 0.082624** 0.082031** 
SCORECARD -0.006079 -0.008615 
LEV 0.009912 0.115299 
SIZE -0.076609 -0.149772 
MBV 0.025596 0.026756 
Rank50 -0.041631 -0.007809 
Dependent Variable ROA ROE 
Sig. of F-Statistics 0.013035** 0.000000* 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.101535 0.383108 
*Significant in level 0.01 
**Significant in level 0.05 
***Significant in level 0.10 
ROA = Return on Assets 
ROE = Return on Equity 
FOR = Foreign Ownership 
SCORECRAD = ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 
LEV = Leverage of firm  
SIZE = Size of firm 
MBV = Market to Book Value 
Rank50 = Big 50 of ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (dummy variable) 
Table 5 shows that variable interaction between ASEAN corporate governance scorecard and foreign 
ownership have coefficient value 0.082624 (significant in level 0.05), with ROA as dependent variable. The 
result is consistent with hypothesis test that use ROE as profitability measurement in this research. In other 
aspects of profitability; such as effectiveness of the uses of assets to generate profits; foreign ownership 
increases profitability if ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is high. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This research is aimed to examine effect of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard on relationship between 
foreign ownership and profitability in five countries of ASEAN. Corporate governance, as a function of 
shareholders protection and transparency; support foreign shareholder role in profits increasing. With good 
corporate governance in areas of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the board, foreign ownership could maximizes increasing of 
competitive advantages brought by foreign shareholders and management monitoring and leads to high 
profitability. 
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4.5 Implication 
This research have implication to firm management, especially manufacture firm in ASEAN. Management could 
make firm policy about optimal foreign ownership structure, or make firm policy about optimal corporate 
governance, so management could maximizes shareholders wealth trough profits increasing. This research have 
implication to stock investor as well. Investors, who have interest send their investment abroad especially in 
ASEAN, have to see condition of corporate governance of public-listed firms, so investors wealth could be 
maximized. 
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